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Abstract
Bitcoin and other similar digital currencies on blockchains are not ideal means
for payment, because their prices tend to go up in the long term (thus people
are incentivized to hoard those currencies), and to fluctuate widely in the short
term (thus people would want to avoid risks of losing values).
The reason why those blockchain currencies based on proof of work are
unstable may be found in their designs that the supplies of currencies do not
respond to their positive and negative demand shocks, as the authors have
formulated in our past work.
Continuing from our past work, this paper proposes minimal changes to the
design of blockchain currencies so that their market prices are automatically
stabilized, absorbing both positive and negative demand shocks of the curren-
cies by autonomously controlling their supplies. Those changes are: 1) limiting
re-adjustment of proof-of-work targets, 2) making mining rewards variable ac-
cording to the observed over-threshold changes of block intervals, and 3) enforc-
ing negative interests to remove old coins in circulation. We have made basic
design checks and evaluations of these measures through simple simulations.
In addition to stabilization of prices, the proposed measures may have ef-
fects of making those currencies preferred means for payment by disincentivizing
hoarding, and improving sustainability of the currency systems by making re-
wards to miners perpetual.
Keywords: digital currency, cryptocurrency, Bitcoin, blockchain, proof of
work
1. Introduction
Digital currencies such as BTC on Bitcoin[1] blockchain and Ether on Ethereum[2]
blockchain are now well-known, and are accepted means for payment in some
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countries. However, these currencies are not ideal as methods of payment be-
cause of instability of their market prices. Their prices tend to go up in the
long term, and to fluctuate widely in the short term. Therefore, people are
incentivized to hoard those currencies, and would want to avoid risks of losing
values by using them for payment. Stability of their market prices needs to be
achieved if these currencies are intended to be used as monetary media instead
of as investment products.
In the authors’ past work[3] (an improved version of the discussion paper
with the same title), we have formulated the mechanism of instability by ana-
lyzing the economics of those blockchain currencies based on proof of work. We
have also proposed measures to stabilize the market prices of such currencies.
The contributions of this paper are refinements of the work as follows:
1. We have refined the formulation of the economic model of blockchain cur-
rencies based on proof of work, using abstractions closer to actual currency
system designs, and
2. We have refined our proposed measures for stabilization of market prices
of the currencies that would absorb both positive and negative demand
shocks.
The proposed measures went through basic design checks and evaluations by
simple simulations.
Our proposals are primarily targeted for Bitcoin and its descendants. For
information of the design of Bitcoin, in addition to the original design paper[1],
we have referred to more up-to-date resources from the project web page[4] and
the code1 itself.
2. Blockchain Currency based on Proof of Work
First, we clarify the design of blockchain currencies based on proof of work.
Any participant in the blockchain network may construct and broadcast (by
flooding) a transaction of coins of which they have control. Figure 1 shows
an example of transaction data structure found in Bitcoin. A transaction may
have a list of inputs each referring to an existing coin as a container of value
(represented as an output of a past transaction), and a non-empty list of outputs
each representing a new coin or null coin (an output used for applications). A
transaction is digitally signed in each input, which is verifiable with the public
key also included in the input. The digest of the public key needs to match the
digest to which the referred output is addressed. This structure is self-contained,
and its validity can be verified by anyone.
The objective of the blockchain’s consensus algorithm (Nakamoto consensus
hereafter) is to maintain a single history of blocks such that it does not involve
any invalid or contradicting transactions. An example of the latter is double
spending of one digital coin, which cannot be prevented by the transaction data
1https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/
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Figure 1: Transaction Structure of Bitcoin - So-called UTXO Model
structure alone. Presumably, the designer (or designers) of this technology first
called it distributed timestamp server because it is intended to keep track of
relative timing of events. As Figure 2 shows, each block contains the crypto-
graphic digest of the previous block, except the very first block sometimes called
the genesis block. Such a digest must meet a certain criterion; it needs to be
less than or equal to the pre-adjusted and agreed target stored in or calculated
from the block (we call this structure hash chain with proof of work hereafter).
Since the digest is calculated by a one-way function whose outputs are evenly
distributed, no one can intentionally configure a block to satisfy the criterion.
Instead, they need to partake repetitive trials to change the values of some nonce
in the block they are creating until they get a right digest. Therefore, creation
of a block is a probabilistic process.
Transactions not found in the agreed chain
are extracted, and eventually get included.
block n
transactions
block n+1 block n+2 block n+3
block n+1 block n+2
digest digest digest digest
digest digest
……
digest ≦ target
Everyone agrees
on the chain with
the highest Proof-
of-Work cost.
Figure 2: Overview of Bitcoin Blockchain - Hash Chain with Proof of Work
The necessity of repetitive trials functions as a proof-of-work mechanism
intended to be a protection against falsification. A transaction itself cannot
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be falsified unless digital signatures are compromised. But it is conceivable to
remove some transactions from a past block or to add fabricated transactions
that did not really exist. If one tries so, the digest of the block is changed
and is typically greater than the target. Then they would have to retry the
proof of work for the block. This changes the digest stored in the next block,
which in turn means that the digest of the next block is also changed and is
typically greater than the target, and so on. In short, ones with a malicious
intention would have to redo the proof of work from where they want to change,
and outdo the ongoing process of adding blocks eventually to make the change
valid, which has generally been considered highly difficult.
Such proof of work can also limit the number of proposed blocks at one
time. But there still is a possibility of multiple participants each proposing
a new block at roughly the same time, which may be accepted by different
sets of participants. Then the hash chain may have multiple ends that are
extended independently from one another, resulting in a fork of the blockchain
with multiple (and possibly, contradicting) histories of blocks. If this happens,
roughly speaking, the longest branch is considered to be correct. More precisely,
to avoid the case of branches with artificially raised targets, the branch that is
the most difficult to produce is chosen by all participants. This reflects the total
cost cast in the creation of the hash chain branch. Because of proof of work, any
chain branch requires the same cost paid for its creation when it is tried to be
falsified. In short, Nakamoto consensus tries to enforce that the most difficult
chain branch to falsify is chosen as the single correct history2.
3. Market Price Mechanism of a Blockchain Currency based on Proof
of Work
3.1. Supply and Demand
The price of a blockchain currency and proof of work are closely related,
because proof of work is closely related to supply of the coins, and the price in
general is a reflection of supply and demand.
The authors have discussed this in detail in our past work[3], and reasoned
that the cause of instability of BTC price is that supply of coins does not respond
to demand shocks.
Figure 3 shows the supply and demand curves of Bitcoin.
Usually for any goods (including money), demand curve slopes downwards
from left to right (negatively sloped) while supply curve slopes positively. The
price is found at the intersection of both curves. If the demand curve shifts
left (demand drops) or right (demand rises), the supply curve would naturally
respond (also shifts left to decreases supply or right to increase) to ease the
shock of demand changes and subsequent price changes.
2For imperfection of the design of Nakamoto consensus, readers are referred to a past
work[5] by the first author of this paper.
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Figure 3: Supply and Demand of Bitcoin with a Vertical Supply Curve
On the other hand, BTC coins are only newly supplied as the reward in
every new block. There just is a rule that the reward is halved every 210,000
blocks. Therefore the supply curve is vertical (more precisely, the supply curve
is slightly positively sloped, because when the demand rises and the price goes
up, there will be slightly more supply before the proof-of-work target is adjusted.
When the demand drops and the price goes down, there will be the opposite
effect). Shifting the demand curve directly affects the price P in the figure.
3.2. Consequences of Proof of Work
Here, we present a revised simpler version of the formulation in our past
work[3] to describe the economics of proof of work.
We start by the number of participants. Suppose M miners participate.
For simplicity, computation power of all miners are considered equal. Thus,
M is rather the total number of mining units with the same hash rate (how
many digests can be calculated in an interval), and the number can increase or
decrease to represent entry and exit of miners. Further, we assume that there
is no monopoly in the mining industry, and miners’ production function does
not have externality or knowledge-intensiveness.
Usually, in the digital world, a production function is considered virtually
free from the law of diminishing returns because the marginal cost of production
is negligible. However, in the case of mining of a blockchain currency, because
the proof-of-work target is adjusted to maintain the same production rate of
the currency, adding more production units would at some point yield lower
incremental per-unit returns, showing similar characteristics to productions in
the physical world. For this reason and with above assumptions, we believe
that the classical competition model (with entry and exit) can be applied to our
arguments, as described below.
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Let λ be the average number of occurrences of an event that a miner with
one mining unit finds a nonce satisfying the required criterion in an interval.
We ignore the cost of communication, so that discoveries of a right nonce are
independent events that can globally occur Mλ times within the interval.
We consider the average interval between successes θ:
θ =
1
Mλ
We assume a cryptographic hash function H with range R. For example, in
case of SHA-256, R = 2256. We define the proof-of-work criterion as follows:
the cryptographic digest of a block by H must be less than or equal to target
G. We define target-reachability g as below.
g =
G
R
Conceptually, difficulty of proof of work is inverse of the target-reachability
g−1.
Suppose that one mining unit tries h times in an interval, so that h represents
the average hash rate of a mining unit. Therefore,
λ = hg
and
θ =
1
Mhg
Let V be the reward of a successful proof of work. Then the reward for the
winners of the mining competition is fixed as about Z altogether per interval.
Z =
V
θ
= VMhg
The expected benefit Bm per mining unit per interval is therefore,
Bm =
Z
M
= V hg
If the market value of bitcoin is given as P , the market value of the expected
benefit is PBm.
Now, we consider the cost Cm for operating one mining unit.
If Cm < PBm, more mining units will participate (M is increased). This in
turn will result in shorter θ, and eventually g will be adjusted with smaller G
to maintain the reference θ (10 minutes in the case of Bitcoin). This will result
in Bm getting smaller.
Conversely if Cm > PBm, less mining units will participate (M is decreased).
Short-term actualization of this would be that miners turn off their mining units.
Long-term actualization would be that miners use their mining units to mine
other compatible and profitable coins, or sell their units to others who mine
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such coins, or just dispose the units, thereby (partially) leaving from the mining
business of the particular currency. Then θ is prolonged, and eventually g will
be adjusted with larger G, resulting in Bm getting larger.
In the long run, the following equilibrium is reached.
Cm = PBm
In other form,
Cm = PV hg (1)
Some readers may wonder if such an equilibrium is still reached if the price
P goes down to zero. If P stays at a near-zero level for a long time, the equation
requires that the cost Cm for operating one mining unit is very small. Please
note that we can set h (and subsequentlyM) at an arbitrary level, so that we can
consider very small h (like once in every 10 minutes) and very large M to start
with, where Cm is then very small. In the case where P is very low, g approaches
1 as M gets smaller and smaller, and in the end, the equilibrium would be
reached. In reality, if h is that infrequent, a miner can use some idle time of a
computer used for other purposes, so that Cm can actually be negligibly small
(P being near zero is most likely caused by downturn of demands, so that by
the time the near-zero-price situation arises, occurrences of transactions would
become very sparse. Therefore the cost of verifying transactions can also be
ignored). If P is maintained to be zero for a long time, however, then the
equation cannot hold, as Cm is non-zero albeit it can be negligibly small. But
if that really happens, then there is no economic reason for mining, so that
no mining unit would want to participate, and eventually the blockchain would
stop, in which case there is no point of discussing the equilibrium anyway.
In the case of Bitcoin, the right side of the equation is contributed as follows:
P : Goes up and down mainly by speculation.
V : Starts at 50BTC, and halved at every 210,000 blocks (12.5BTC as of year
2018).
h: Increases by technological advance.
g: Target G is adjusted every 2,016 blocks to maintain the same reference value
of θ (10 minutes).
The left side of the equation Cm, the cost for operating one mining unit, can
be roughly modeled as h multiplied by the unit cost of electricity Cem, so that
Cm = hC
e
m. From the previous equation, we get hC
e
m = PV hg. By dividing
both sides with h, we get Cem = PV g. This suggests that expected gain, PV g,
will in long term balance with the unit cost of electricity Cem. In a long run, C
e
m
decreases while h increases, both by technological advances, which are possibly
motivated by rise of PV g. But their changes are gradual.
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In short term, there is no doubt that P is the driving force of disequilibrium
and subsequent changes in the number of mining units M and then target-
reachability g, but P may also be affected by g through people’s expectations,
which is affected by M . If g gets halved by M becoming doubled, there is a
room for P to get doubled. When V gets halved at every 210,000 blocks, if g
is unmoved, then P would need to be doubled to reach the equilibrium (and
miners have reasons to want that to happen). If it does not happen, miners
would need to leave, so that M gets halved, and in turn, g becomes doubled.
Equation (1) gives the long-term target for equilibrium, which we believe
would explain the overall movements of price of bitcoins. In short term, it
seems that the price goes up and down by people’s expectations or operational
intentions of the price to go up or down. This has been made possible because
supply does not respond against demand shocks to begin with — it is easy to
control the price by demands. We expect that observed wide fluctuations of
price in short term would be improved if a modification is made in the design
of the currency system such that the supply responds against demand shocks.
4. Measures against Positive Demand Shock
4.1. Limited Target Re-adjustments
To mitigate the effects of positive demand shock, in our past work[3], we
have suggested no adjustment to target G unless θ is very short.
The reason is that we would like to increase the supply of coins by increasing
Z when the demand increases. To do so, we can only increase V or shorten θ.
What miners can do autonomously through their own decisions is to increase
M (by making more investments), and thereby shorten θ.
But how short is very short, where adjustment of G is eventually needed?
To prevent the blockchain from accidental forks as described in [6], θ should
have the minimum limit. Let it be θmin. G should be adjusted well before θ
reaches θmin. So we will adjust G when a certain threshold θ
′ is reached where
θ′ > θmin.
4.2. Target Re-adjustments for Positive Shock
We propose that θ′ shall be the half of the reference θ (10 minutes in the
case of Bitcoin), where G must get halved. At the same time, we double V to
maintain the same pace of the supply of coins.
To make this happen, the system needs to refer to real time, which had been
considered difficult for blockchains where timestamps in blocks can be untrue.
But now, we have the concept of MTP (Median Time Past; the median time of
the 11 blocks in the past) as a standard measure for the purpose. We check the
average interval between blocks using MTP, every after 100 blocks, for example.
In the case of Bitcoin, because the reference θ is 10 minutes, 100 blocks takes
about 17 hours. When θ is halved, it can be detected within a half day or so.
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5. Measures against Negative Demand Shock
5.1. Two-fold Propositions
We propose the measures to mitigate the effects of negative demand shock
in two fold:
1. No adjustment to target G unless the maximal tolerable average interval
θmax is reached.
2. Continuous removal of coins in circulation so that less total supply of coins
can be achieved, not only new supply.
For the former, we propose the following adjustment rule for G: when 20% of
M is observed to have left (θ is observed to be 5
4
times longer than the reference
value), make G 5
4
times larger. At the same time, make V 80% of the reward
at the time to maintain the same pace of supply of coins. This adjustment will
likely to occur within a couple of days after a negative demand shock. We think
that this asymmetry in the rules against positive and negative demand shocks
is necessary because time measured with block creations is prolonged as θ gets
prolonged.
For the latter above, we must invent something new, because blockchain
currency protocols usually include the currency supply rule, but does not have
a currency absorption or write-off rule.
5.2. Negative Interests
In our past work[3], we have suggested an implicit inflation target. But in
this paper, we propose an implementation of negative interests, and no halving
rule for V .
Let us consider coinage eras, where each era is, for example, consecutive
2016 blocks. Hereafter in this section, time is measured by the coinage eras.
Let Zt be the amount of produced coins at time t (if t is the current coinage
era, Zt denotes the amount of produced coins in the era so far).
We define a depreciation rule so that effective values of coins are depreciated
as time elapses. This depreciation can be like 1% of the original value as of
production of the coin, after every coinage era elapses. Let the amount of
depreciation of coins produced at time t evaluated at time T to be Dt(T ).
The total supply of coins in circulation S(T ) at time T is, then
S(T ) =
T∑
t=0
(Zt −Dt(T ))
which is expected to remain constant except during positive or negative demand
shocks. Dt(T ) can be a function like below, in the case of 1% depreciation of
the original at every coinage era.
Dt(T ) = min(Zt, Zt × 0.01(T − t))
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Figure 4: UTXO Transaction Structure with Depreciation of Coin Values
5.3. Implementation for UTXO Structure
Figure 4 shows how depreciation is implemented on a UTXO structure. In
the figure, transaction 1 happened in coinage era E, transaction 2 happened in
some coinage era between E′ and E′′, and transaction 3 is happening in coinage
era E′′.
Because coins produced in different eras have different depreciation levels,
they need to be treated separately in a transaction. In transaction 3 in the
figure, unlike the original design of Bitcoin transactions, inputs referring to
the coin values originated from era E and era E′ are connected separately to
different outputs to give total of value 30 to user B. Because coins originated
at greater than or equal to 100 eras before do not exist with the 1%-per-era
depreciation rule (they are evaluated as value 0, so they cannot be referred to),
at-most 100 kinds of these inputs-outputs connections are expressed in a single
transaction.
A series of inputs-outputs connections originated in an era forms a coinage
era graph that takes a form of directed acyclic graph. In the figure, there are
two of such graphs, one originated in era E and another originated in era E′.
To evaluate the depreciated coin value of an input, a wallet software to
build a new transaction data or a miner to verify the correctness of the data
does not need to look for all sources and distributions of the coinage era graph
in question. It just needs to know 1) which era the graph is originated, 2) to
which era the transaction being referred to belongs, and 3) the era to which
the created transaction is intended to belong. For example, in the figure, to
evaluate the depreciated value at era E′′ of the output of transaction 2, one just
need to divide 23.75 with 0.95 (because of 5% depreciation at transaction 2) to
get the original amount, and subtract 10% from the amount to get 22.5.
With this depreciation rule, when it is near the border of two coinage eras, a
transaction might not make it in the block of the intended era. If that happens,
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the transaction data needs to be discarded (or verification of the transaction
would fail anyway because its outputs would be more than allowed), and the
wallet software needs to recreate the transaction intended for the new era. Be-
cause of further depreciation in the new era, the wallet may need to reform the
transaction to output the intended amount.
6. Simulation
First, we will make basic design checks of our proposed measures through
simple simulations. Then, we will evaluate the measures using an artificial
market with simulated simple human behaviors.
6.1. Target and Reward Re-adjustments
Figure 5 shows a sample distribution of block intervals for different total hash
rates (1×, 2× and 0.8× of the reference value where θ equals 10 minutes) to
check the validity of proposed thresholds for target and reward re-adjustments.
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Figure 5: Distribution of Block Intervals
We assumed Poisson distribution of events. We generated 100 random counts
of occurrences according to the distribution in 100 minutes, and plotted them
on the graph through an evaluation of possibility density (frequency of occur-
rences). We have tried many iterations, and other iterations show basically the
same shapes.
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In the graph, 2× of the reference hash rate produces blocks in rather short
intervals. To make this well-longer than θmin, the currency’s network protocol
may need to be improved, as suggested in [6].
On the other hand, 0.8× of the reference hash rate produces blocks in sim-
ilar intervals to the reference condition. This is good in terms of detection of
decreased M because it means that the detection may be possible before users
begin to feel that block creations are getting delayed. But do not these detec-
tions happen too often? Actual data from Bitcoin blockchain, found at [7] for
example, shows that this event of the average interval reaching 5
4
of the reference
(12.5 minutes) is rather rare (except during congestions observed in late 2017).
6.2. Reduction of Supply
Figure 6 shows a simulation result on the amount of coins in circulation
with depreciation. In the simulation, we have run the total of 1,000 coinage
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Figure 6: Simulated Total Amount in Circulation
eras each containing 2016 blocks (equals to 2,016,000 blocks). With reference
block interval of 10 minutes, 100 blocks (to detect changes in θ) amount to
about 17 hours, 2016 blocks (1 coinage era) amount to 2 weeks, and 100 coinage
eras (time for 100% depreciation) amount to a little less than 4 years. But note
that the graph is drawn in blocks, not in real time. In reality, the intervals
between blocks may fluctuate largely. The reward for block creation starts
12
at 12.5, and is adjusted through observed demand shocks injected artificially
during the simulation.
A positive demand shock is injected at block 500,000, which is recovered
around block 506,000, and a negative demand shock is injected at block 1,000,000,
which is recovered around block 1,030,000.
Note that slight increase in the supply is caused by offsetting the doubling
rule (V = V × 2) with taking-80% rule (V = V × 0.8) for three times (amounts
to 0.512 of V at the beginning of offsetting). In reality, supply is also adjusted
by autonomous fluctuation of θ.
It shows that the supply of coins remains fairly constant even after positive
and negative demand shocks and their recoveries by the market price mecha-
nism.
6.3. Artificial Market
We call the currency with the proposed measures Stabilized Coin hereafter,
and compare it with Bitcoin through simulations over an artificial market we
define as follows.
6.3.1. Model
Agents.
We start with defining agents. We define a set of speculators Us where
|Us| = Ns and a set of common traders Ur where |Ur| = Nr. Speculators and
common traders are collectively called traders hereafter. Each trader u ∈ Us
or u ∈ Ur is associated with market-sensitivity u
s where 0 < us ≤ 1, evenly
distributed among the traders in each set. They are also associated with balance
of the coins being simulated (either Bitcoin or Stabilized Coin, depending on the
specific simulation) ub, and reference price of the currency up initialized as price
P at the beginning of each simulation. In addition, a speculator is associated
with previous reference price upp (up = upp to start). We assume that they have
unlimited supply of fiat currency to purchase the coins, but actual spending of
the fiat currency is regulated by probabilities of making orders and ordering
amounts, which are set proportional to us.
We define a set of mining units Um where |Um| = M . Um is collectively
associated with balance of the coins U bm.
Market.
We define a daily market < Us, Ur, Um, E > where E is an exchange, at
which ordering to buy or sell coins, clearing the orders, and updating the price
P is made once everyday.
For simplicity, miners Um is purely a supplier of the coins, always trying to
clear U bm by selling all coins they have.
Trader u ∈ Us or u ∈ Ur makes an order to buy u
b × us × 0.2 amount of
coins by probability p, and to sell the equal amount of coins by probability 1−p
(for random market movements).
In addition, speculators and common traders behave differently as follows:
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• Speculator u ∈ Us makes an order to sell u
b × us × 0.8 amount of coins
if the price P is greater than up × (1 + u
s
2
), and to buy the same amount
of coins if P is less than up × (1 − u
s
2
) (they try to make profits by “buy
low, sell high” strategy). In either case, u updates the reference prices so
that upp := up and then up := P . However, in the case that P is less than
upp × (1 − u
s
2
) × 1
2
, u makes an order to buy the same amount of coins
as above, but neither up nor upp are updated (to save the market from
crashing and to continue to make more profits).
• Common trader u ∈ Ur makes an order to buy u
b × us × 0.8 amount of
coins if the price P is greater than up × (1 + u
s
2
), and to sell the same
amount of coins if P is less than up× (1− u
s
2
) (they follow market trends,
ending up buying high and selling low). In either case, u updates the
reference price so that up := P .
According to the orders, matching is made at the exchange. Miners’ offering
is cleared first, and then the priority is set for smaller trade volumes.
Price Formation.
We adopt the simplest price formation model according to [8],
∆Pt = Pt+1 − Pt = α(Dt − St)
where Pt, Dt and St denote the price, demand and supply at time t (measured
by days), respectively, and α is the sensitivity of price against the difference
between demand and supply. In the simulations, ∆Pt is truncated to maintain
−Pt
2
≤ ∆Pt ≤
Pt
2
.
In reality, it is most likely that α is not constant. We adopt this simple
model so that we can evaluate the effects of α over stability of the price.
6.3.2. Parameters
Where applicable, we use parameter values observed in the real Bitcoin
blockchain and trade markets of BTC. We start our simulation time at the be-
ginning of a reward era, namely when the reward became 12.5BTC (the start of
the current reward era as of 2018). The reason behind this choice is that miners
would in reality behave actively to boost the currency price upon reward-halving
events, which we would like to avoid implementing in our model for simplicity.
We would like to set the reward-halving event as late in the simulation time as
possible.
From the information at [9], we have identified that the current reward era
started on July 9, 2016. The market price in USD (US Dollar) of bitcoin on
that day is found at “Market Price (USD)” section of [10], and is 652.00USD.
The estimated transaction volume on that day is found at “Estimated Trans-
action Value” section of [10], and is 216,546BTC. Parameters have been config-
ured to produce more or less similar daily transaction volumes, assuming that
most bitcoin transactions are trades instead of payments.
Table 1 shows the list of parameters used for the simulations.
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Table 1: Artificial Market Simulation Parameters
Constant cost Cm 815 Equation (1) is assumed to hold at start
Initial price P 652.00 USD price of BTC on July 9, 2016
Initial reward V 12.5 We try 50, 25, 12.5 and 6.25
Constant unit hash rate h 1.0 Abstract rate
Initial target-reachability g 0.1 Abstract probability
Initial number of miners M 1000 Lower-bound is 100
Total coins at the beginning 15,750,000 Total BTC generated before July 9, 2016
Number of speculators Ns 500 Initial 10,000,000 coins evenly distributed
Number of common traders Nr 1,000 Initial 5,750,000 coins evenly distributed
Constant probability to buy p 0.52 To offset the tendency for larger supply
Constant sensitivity of price α 0.0001 We try 0.00001, 0.0001 and 0.001
Simulation time in days 3,650 10 years
Equation (1) is evaluated every day. PV hg is calculated and compared with
the constant cost Cm. M then increases or decreases by 1% accordingly towards
the equilibrium, with its lower-bound set to be 100.
6.3.3. Price Changes
Figure 7 shows the results of simulated price changes of Bitcoin and Stabi-
lized Coin.
In reality, Bitcoin price has hit 18,962USD on December 17, 2017 as found
at [10], but this simulation shows the maximum price in 10 years as just below
7,000. We have also seen occasional drops of the price of bitcoin in reality, but
the simulation shows mostly monotonous increase. By no means, this simulation
is a trial to reproduce the events and their effects observed in reality, but is a
demonstration of our model.
The price of Stabilized Coin seems relatively stable in the simulation, but
the fluctuation may seem too big to be used as means for payment (we will later
discuss this in section 6.3.6).
6.3.4. Transacted Quantity
Figure 8 shows the results of simulated transaction quantities of Bitcoin and
Stabilized Coin, from the same simulation as the previous section.
Those begin at 261,778.7 and 259,159.92, respectively, roughly reproducing
the real quantity of 216,546BTC as found at [10]. In the case of the simulated
Bitcoin, as long as transacted quantities are concerned, the simulation seems to
be a good reproduction of reality.
6.3.5. Hash Rate
Figure 9 shows the movements of hash rates during the same simulations of
Bitcoin and Stabilized Coin.
The simulated Bitcoin hash rates do not seem real. In reality, Bitcoin hash
rates grow exponentially. The reason would be that miners in reality are active
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Figure 7: Simulated Price Changes of Bitcoin and Stabilized Coin
traders, and behave like speculators themselves. But instead of buying coins
while their price is low, they try to produce coins by mining.
Such behaviors are not included in our model, because it would not fit in the
case of Stabilized Coin, where participating in the production of coins means
taking the role of lowering the currency price. We did not want to implement
different agent behaviors between simulations of Bitcoin and Stabilized Coin, as
it would make fair comparisons difficult.
The simulated Stabilized Coin hash rates goes up and down. The real
hash rate on July 9, 2016 is found at “Hash Rate” section of [10], and was
1,580,610TH/s. Because the initial abstracted total hash rate in this simulation
is 1,000, the highest hash rate in the graph, about 30,000, would amount to
47,418,300TH/s in reality. The observed highest Bitcoin hash rate so far (as of
writing of this manuscript) was 43,161,058TH/s on June 24, 2018. So, it seems
somewhat feasible, depending on your views. However, this would raise a more
serious question than just feasibility. The hash rate going up and down rela-
tively rapidly would be a potential security threat for Stabilized Coin, discussed
later in section 7.2.
6.3.6. Effects of Sensitivity of Price
Figure 10 shows the results of simulated price changes of Bitcoin where the
sensitivity of price α is varied among 0.001, 0.0001 (default in our model) and
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Figure 8: Simulated Transacted Quantity of Bitcoin and Stabilized Coin
0.00001.
The effects of α against the simulated Bitcoin prices seem straightforward.
The larger α is, the higher the price goes. In the case of α = 0.00001, the
price seems constant in the graph, but it actually shows a mostly monotonous
increase of the price, which almost doubles.
Figure 11 shows the results of simulated price changes of Stabilized Coin
where the sensitivity of price α is varied in the same way.
It is clear from the graph that α takes an important role in stability of the
simulated currency price. The smaller α is, the more stable the price becomes.
But, even in the case of α = 0.00001, the price seems to fluctuate fairly largely.
We need a reference to evaluate whether these levels of fluctuations are tolerable
or not.
Figure 12 shows a comparison with the historical changes of USD and Japanese
Yen (JPY) exchange rate. We have obtained the historical data from [11], and
extracted the exchange rates of recent 10 years (July 7, 2008 to July 6, 2018).
To put them in the same scale, we compared the historical changes with the
prices of 0.153 Stabilized Coin (where α = 0.00001) and 0.151 Stabilized Coin
(where α = 0.0001).
It shows that the price changes of the simulation results are comparable with
the price changes of currencies in real life, although fluctuation is larger in the
case of α = 0.0001.
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Figure 9: Simulated Hash Rates of Bitcoin and Stabilized Coin
6.3.7. Effects of Initial Rewards
Figure 13 shows the results of simulated price changes of Stabilized Coin
where the initial reward for making blocks is varied among 6.25, 12.5 (default
in our model), 25 and 50.
It shows that the smaller the initial reward is, the higher the price tends to
go, because the rewards at block creations represent new supply to the market,
bringing the price of coins down.
In the case of initial reward = 25, the graph shows that the price goes
stable while slowly declining after around day 2,000. We do not think that
this is a success, but instead, it shows limitation of our simulation model. In
this particular case, the distribution of the coins makes that random market
movements cannot be large enough to cause speculative moves of traders any
more.
7. Discussion
7.1. Responsiveness
In order for the price stabilization to work, the number of miners M needs
to be quickly responding to demand changes. But the initial investment cost
and sunk cost effects for miners may defer their entries and exits, although
exiting miners have a choice of just turning (part of) their machines off instead
of entirely leaving the business.
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Figure 10: Effects of Sensitivity of Price α (Bitcoin)
Recently, some new blockchain currencies have been started by hard forks
(backward-incompatible changes of the protocols) from existing currencies. It
is called a split of a blockchain.
Ethereum Classic[12], started in 2016, is probably the first of such instance,
splitted from Ethereum due to a disagreement in the governance. Bitcoin
Cash[13], started in 2017, is the first instance of splitting a new currency from
Bitcoin.
Unless further changes are made on the proof of work algorithm, mining
these currencies is compatible with the original blockchain currency. Therefore,
miners may switch back and forth among compatible currencies, pursuing more
profits. This switch can even be automated. With this competition among
currencies, M can be quickly responding to price changes according to demand
shocks, making the proposed measures more effective.
7.2. Security
However, variance of M would raise security concerns. A blockchain based
on proof of work is protected by the collective cost of mining. Bitcoin blockchain
is difficult to attack because its hash rate is exponentially growing, so that ex-
isting mining facilities become obsolete quickly. If it is not the case, by utilizing
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α = 0.001 Min. Price 31.96 Max. Price 1198.52
α = 0.0001 491.63 846.84
α = 0.00001 576.46 728.39
Figure 11: Effects of Sensitivity of Price α (Stabilized Coin)
available unused facilities, it would be easier to conduct so-called 51% attack3
or block withholding attack (variance of selfish mining[14] to withhold created
blocks while broadcasting contradicting transactions to perform double spend-
ing). This type of threat is real in many existing cryptocurrencies, with actual
cases of attacks against currencies called Monacoin and Bitcoin Gold[15] in May
2018. This problem seems to be inherent of the design based on proof of work.
7.3. Applicability to Structures other than UTXO
We described how to implement depreciation, or negative interests, on a
UTXO structure in section 5.3. But there are blockchain currencies that do not
depend on UTXO structures. Ethereum, for example, maintains the account
states in each participating node, and transactions (encoded state transfers)
only are stored in the blockchain.
With this account-state design approach, assuming the rule of 1% deprecia-
tion over a coinage era we described, 100 different sets of balances are required
for an account to maintain a single currency, for storing the values without
3Actually, attack should be meaningful upon reaching just 50% of total hash rate, in which
case it becomes uncertain whether the correct miners would win the race of creating blocks
or not.
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JPY price of 1USD Min. Price 75.72 Max. Price 125.58
price of 0.153 coin (α = 0.00001) 88.20 111.44
price of 0.151 coin (α = 0.0001) 74.24 127.87
Figure 12: Comparison with Historical Changes of USD-JPY Exchange Rate
depreciation in the past 100 eras separately. These values are each negatively
weighted as they are depreciated, upon calculating the effective balances.
7.4. Deployment
If we start a new blockchain currency with the proposed measures from its
genesis block, it would have to start with virtually zero price level, and since
the mechanism is intended to avoid speculations, the price level would remain
near zero, not suitable to be used as a monetary medium to represent values of
goods or services.
To avoid such a situation, we may want to utilize a split to employ the
inertia of the original existing currency. If we start a new currency by splitting
it from Bitcoin, for example, the new currency can start with a useful price
level and enough attention, although how existing coins should be depreciated
is a problem to consider. In the artificial market simulation in section 6.3, we
just implemented depreciation in a straightforward way, not considering human
reactions.
7.5. Sustainability
With the proposed measures, the amount of coins in circulation is automati-
cally maintained to be near constant, and there is no need for external measures
21
Figure 13: Effects of Initial Rewards (Stabilized Coin)
to cap the supply of coins, such as the rule of halving rewards as found in Bitcoin.
Rewards for block creations to miners can be perpetual, providing a possible
solution to the problem of sustainability in concern.
This means that miners do not need to rely on fees, so we may as well want
to abandon transaction fees altogether.
7.6. Effects of Depreciation
In order for the price stabilization to work, the created coins must actually
be supplied into the market. In our proposal, because coins are depreciated,
miners are incentivized to sell coins they created before they lose values. The
supply is expected to be quick.
But this should be true for all users, not only for miners. In other words,
depreciation should accelerate spending. The first author of this paper has made
a detail study on the effects of depreciating (and amplifying) digital currencies
in [16] before rise of blockchain currencies. Some of the outcomes of the work
may still be applicable.
But a natural question would be, do people prefer currencies that depreciate
over others that do not? Our answer may be non-intuitive, but yes.
In our proposal, transactions can be free of charge, as suggested in the pre-
vious section. Then depreciation can be a beneficial choice for users, because
choices are between always paying transaction fees and possibly avoiding any
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kinds of it by spending before depreciation takes place. (Note that we are dis-
cussing digital currencies as media of exchange instead of investment products.)
7.7. Effects of Splitting
Finally, let us consider the case where a currency with proposed measures
itself gets splitted, as it is a possibility for any blockchain currencies today.
If it happens, it creates a situation where M decreases for both original and
newly splitted currencies. Thus, both currencies would automatically react as
if a negative demand shock occurred (which may be the case anyway, if the
same set of budgets is used for purchasing both currencies). In case the new
currency took half of the miners, the pace of block creation is slowed down, but
eventually the average interval θ gets normal, and the reward V is about halved
for both currencies. If these two currencies compete well, the total coin amount
in circulation is eventually halved for each currency, maintaining the total sum
of the amounts of two currencies to be equal to the amount of the original
currency coins in circulation before the split. When the process is complete,
all coins copied to the new currency upon the split would have already been
depreciated down to zero, and the two currencies are completely independent
from one another in terms of the coins in circulation.
Therefore, in theory, the split would eventually result in two currencies with
the maintained same level of prices as before and with the same amount in total
in circulation as before. But how the market in reality reacts against this would
need further study.
8. Related Work
8.1. Improvements to Digital Currency Design
Improvements to the original design of Bitcoin have been proposed many
times. Many of them have taken the forms of alternative coins (altcoins), instead
of research papers.
Among these, one of the most well-known examples is Litecoin[17], from
which many other altcoins forked their code. Litecoin has shown that with
basically the same proof of work mechanism as Bitcoin (although cryptographic
hash function in question is different), average block intervals can be as short as
2 minutes (Ethereum maintains average block intervals as short as 15 seconds,
but with lots of other improved designs).
Bitcoin Cash was born by a split from Bitcoin, addressing the issue of im-
proving the throughput by adjustable block sizes. Many other new currencies
have followed the practice of splitting.
Sidechains[18] provide another forms of testing improvements to blockchains
and their currencies.
To our best knowledge, none of these address measures against the negative
demand shock (no means to collect coins in circulation to control supply of
them).
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Another approach towards stabilization of currency prices is stable coin[19],
which is relatively a new term, but the concept has existed for many years in the
form of electronic money. The prices of the coins are pegged with fiat currencies.
Tether[20] is a well known example of such stable coins.
8.2. Models of Economics
Economics of mining has also been modeled in [21] [22], where the model is
used for simulating the price clearing mechanism in the market using a virtual
order book similar to that presented in [23]. Another trial on understanding
economics of Bitcoin through simulations with an artificial market is found in
[24], using the terminology and strategies of actual tradings. [25] makes research
on competition among cryptocurrencies. [26] analyzes how Bitcoin prices were
historically formed through exchanges. [27] and [28] each gives a view of Bitcoin
Economics. [29] gives such a view on cryptocurrencies in general.
Our model is far simpler compared with these, intended for analysis of the
problems and devising solutions. The points of our work are twofold: 1) by
paying attention to economically rational behaviors of miners, where mining can
be viewed as if it is more or less like production of goods in firms, we can describe
how miners behave against coin prices in perspective, and 2) by changing the
rules for such behaviors of miners, we can create a negative feedback to the coin
prices.
We understand that there may be a different approach, e.g., to formulate a
total economics such that the coin prices arise endogenously from the model.
We agree that such a model, if successfully built, has significance. However,
we believe that it is difficult to fulfill our goal with such an approach, because
any price is rational in Bitcoin-like currencies — whatever a price may be, once
it is predicted that the market would hold it, then the difficulty target for
producing coins will be adjusted accordingly to the price level, so that any price
is effectively an equilibrium price that balances the supply and demand. In
other words, the prices are determined by the psychological states of those who
are interested in the coins. It means that the prices can easily be manipulated.
If we could build a model from which the coin prices arise endogenously, people
would still be able to make movements that would break the model. Instead
of working with such a difficulty of handling psychological states of people, our
method is to begin with the view that miners reacting against prices resemble
firms producing goods, and we believe that we have shown that still it can lead
to fulfilling our goal of designing a system that would make the currency prices
stable.
The objective of equation (1) is to formulate behaviors of miners, instead of
constructing a total economic model for coin prices. We believe that we have
successfully formulated the behaviors of miners, as our model reflects the reality.
When we see the actual movements of prices and hash rates of Bitcoin4, we
observe general long-term tendencies that the hash rate rises as the price keeps
4 Observable from, for example, https://www.blockchain.com/charts
24
rising (the all-time tendency of Bitcoin hash rate until September 2018), and the
hash rate falls as the price keeps falling (a tendency of Bitcoin hash rate from
September to December 2018 — a downfall tendency never observed before).
Miners can freely behave speculatively to try to maintain or raise the values of
the coins they own in the short term, but in the long run, as we have predicted,
their moves seem to conform to the economic rationality of equation (1).
However, in order to evaluate the effectiveness of our proposed measures in
more detail, and to further improve the design, we may want to refine the artifi-
cial market methods according to those found in related work above ourselves,
with insights from past work on dynamic behaviors of prices such as [30], and
on agent-based simulations such as [31].
9. Conclusions
Continuing from our past work, this paper proposed minimal changes to the
design of blockchain currencies so that their market prices are automatically
stabilized, absorbing both positive and negative demand shocks of the currencies
by autonomously controlling their supplies.
We have evaluated the proposed measures with simple simulations including
those using an agent-based artificial market. We have shown that resulted price
changes are comparable with those of currencies in real life, suggesting the
effectiveness of the measures. However, more sophistications of the simulations
and/or testbed trials would be needed to further the research.
In addition to stabilization of prices, the proposed measures may have ef-
fects of making those currencies preferred means for payment by disincentivizing
hoarding, and improving sustainability of the currency systems by making re-
wards to miners perpetual without need for transaction fees.
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